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Earthquake and the Imperatives of Chinese Mourning
June 12, 2008 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 3 comments

By Don Sutton
Disasters like the great Sichuan earthquake expose not only mass suffering but also the imperative of
proper treatment of the dead. Long before the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, governments
in China had concerned themselves with such matters. Today, ranking only behind the weighty
practical matters of rescue, flood prevention, and caring for the injured and homeless, sensitivity to
mourning is a key measure of the government’s performance, one complicated by ethnic diversity,
rural/urban differences, and the government’s own commitment to reform those practices it regards
as superstitions.

An image of Taoping, the principal Qiang tourist village, taken before the earthquake.

For all the simplification of death rituals, a strong Chinese belief persists that survivors have to repay
obligations incurred in life. The party state has not always done right by the dead. For the sake of
party authority and social harmony the regime did little to commemorate the ordinary victims of the
famine years of 1960-61 or the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). And it did nothing at all to honor those
who died during the military suppression of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement of 1989—
aside from some soldiers, that is, who lost their lives. But in the earthquake crisis China’s leaders have
generally been more sensitive.
The most elementary obligation, not of course uniquely Chinese, is to identify the dead and dispose of
them properly: rural Chinese still widely practice burial, despite the government propaganda for
cremation. Since the quake, the government has resorted to advance DNA testing for those mass
burials that have been hastened to prevent epidemic disease, though many bodies in remote towns
and villages still lie under the ruins.
Another obligation is to settle the souls. The dead are still thought, at least by many rural people, to
pass through the underworld courts with the help of a 49-day period of periodic ritual observances.
(The dangers presented by wronged, wracked and ignored souls are the subject matter of
innumerable folk operas and movies.) At the site of building collapses in the past few weeks
firecrackers are exploded as each new body is dug up, and the family members burn spirit money for
the use of their dead in the hereafter. Proper mourning will have to wait.
Yet another longstanding obligation is to express one’s bereavement with sincerity, in the case of
women, vocally. Bereaved women have been photographed wailing at quake sites displaying
photographs of their loved ones. Some have called angrily for investigation into shoddy building
practices at some of the schools where a total of 9,000 children and teachers died. Such
demonstrations are usually proscribed, but given the moral resonance of

mourning, the police have been hard put to stop
them. Whether the calls for legal remedy will outweigh the need to protect local party officials, who
are part of the leadership’s base, is yet to be known. But the obligation to condole sincerely is equally
Chinese. While official ceremonies favor speeches and dirges, Premier Wen and other officials,
realizing this obligation, have displayed arduous commitment and genuine emotion. A Chinese
journalist’s account of “Grandpa Wen” refusing to treat his abrasions when he slipped in the rubble is
strongly reminiscent of imperial officials who fasted and braved the elements during drought and other
emergencies in order to share their people’s suffering.
Emergency conditions have, then, interfered with normal mourning, and local and official
extemporizations have also reflected different conceptions. What is proper mourning is also
complicated by China’s ethnic diversity. It is at first sight curious that so little has been said about the
Qiang minority, which dominates Wenchuan county near the epicenter and must have sent many of its
best and brightest to the collapsed middle school. Tourists who have visited nearby Taoping hamlet
must be wondering how the great unmortared stone towers in which many locals live could have
withstood the earthquake, and indeed Taoping is on the list of affected places. Such communities used
to mourn their dead with a shaman’s martial performance, and, in the case of deaths by accident,
cremated the bodies. But the Qiang are relatively assimilated; while their colorful traditionalism and
picturesqueness are normally played up for tourists and in TV performances for national holidays,
government reports in the crisis have preferred to underline the nation’s solidarity behind all of its
citizens.
Coming in the same year as the great southern snowfall and just two months after the Tibetan
disturbances, the Wenchuan earthquake must have reminded some Chinese of 1976, the year of the
Tangshan earthquake. Historically, national disasters were signs of imbalance in the world, cracks in
the political firmament, even harbingers of a new regime, as the heavenly mandate shifted to a new
dynastic pretender. Even in 1976 these ideas were archaic, for the last emperor of the Qing (16441911) had abdicated some 64 years earlier, but people could not help noticing that two leading
revolutionary leaders, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, died in the months shortly before that earthquake.
When Mao Zedong died that September, followed by the removal of the radical group now cursed as
the Gang of Four, the pattern seemed to be confirmed. Within two years Deng Xiaoping’s reforms
were inaugurated. An earthquake had signaled vast political change.
Today’s leaders, in more secure and prosperous times, must have remembered the inadequate
response of the radical leadership in 1976. The Gang of Four had seen the relief as a distraction from
the current political campaign against Deng Xiaoping, then temporarily out of power, and it had been
Mao’s recently designated heir Hua Guofeng who went a week after the Tangshan quake to take
command of the relief work, an act that won him great political credit and may have helped the
overthrow of the Gang of Four after Mao’s death. Premier Wen Jiabao came within an hour an a half to
supervise relief, and unlike Hua Guofeng who in those post-Cultural Revolution days preached selfreliance, Wen has opened China’s disaster to foreign help and media transparency in a spirit of
globalism suiting the year of the Chinese Olympics. Proof that 1976 was on the leaders’ minds came
when they set mourning for the 70,000 earthquake dead at three days, beginning with three minutes
of silence nationwide, concurrent with the sounding of factory and ship sirens and horn blasts—exactly

the same as for Mao Zedong. (Deng Xiaoping in 1997 got only the sirens and horn blasts, with six
days of pro-forma mourning.)
Some of the national mourning has been under official direction: a Japanese news team reported a
CCTV producer carefully instructing relief workers to dig, pause, and doff their caps just before the
three minutes of national silence. Such coaching in the ways of modernity recalls the sedulous efforts,
as the days of the Olympics approach, to reform the city manners of Beijing inhabitants. Old customs
have this year been modified: in some places the candles customarily floated on streams on June 7,
the eve of the Duanwu festival, were specially dedicated to the victims of the May 12 quake. New
national means of mourning have also sprung up, more or less spontaneously. There have been
parades of young people shouting patriotic slogans, urging the survivors to take courage, and sitting
after dark around candles in the shape of “5/12.“
Even more novel is the huge expansion of condolence pages on the Internet: on one combined site
70,000 people have selected virtual flowers and left a brief message. The principal theme of these web
messages is to wish for the fortitude of the bereaved, and urge the Chinese people to be strong and
united. Many Internet users offer consolation that the dead children are already in heaven; maybe,
say some, they are already reborn—a surprisingly Buddhist sentiment for the city folk who make up
most Internet users. Whatever form is used, the sympathy seems heartfelt, and is infused with a
patriotic fervor that reminds foreign reporters of Han Chinese reactions to criticisms of China’s Tibet
policy a few weeks earlier. Anticipatory pride in China’s upcoming Olympics fortifies these very varied
expressions—no doubt we shall soon be hearing similar patriotic cries of jiayou and wansui as China
proudly counts its gold Olympic medals.
One of the strangest events has been the solemn burial (with speeches and food offerings) of the only
panda that died at the Wolong reserve in the quake zone; but it makes sense if we recall the
ubiquitous use of the panda (above all in Sichuan) as a national symbol.
The party leaders may have mixed feelings at this point: they seem to have coped well with the crisis,
and now proclaim victory in the battle with nature in a hi-tech make-over of Maoist efforts, having
mobilized the PLA, in particular, with notably more success than in 1976. With the help of
unaccustomed flexibility from the Propaganda Department as it reaches out to an international
audience, they ride at the top of a wave of popularity. But as they contemplate the public’s
spontaneous reactions, including the practical intervention of NGO’s and private car owners who
organized to bring relief from Chengdu to the quake zone, they might harbor some worries: Will the
Wenchuan parents’ anger at school building code violations be picked up by elements of the press? (as
it was in a Sina.com blog headed “Who killed our children?”) Will independently channeled emotion in
the public sphere inevitably back the party state in future crises? Will other leaders have to switch to
the unconventionally populist style that Grandpa Wen has adopted so successfully in this time of
mourning and recuperation?

The author with Qiang people dressed for a festival in Songpan,
Aba Prefecture, Sichuan.
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Above and right, more photos by the author of Qiang national minority at Huanglong, Aba Prefecture, during the festival of 2004,
and, below, a photo of several men practicing throat-singing.

